Depression, School Performance, and the Veridicality of Perceived Grades and Causal Attributions by Försterling, Friedrich & Binser, Martin J.
 http://psp.sagepub.com/
Bulletin
Personality and Social Psychology
 http://psp.sagepub.com/content/28/10/1441
The online version of this article can be found at:
 
DOI: 10.1177/014616702236875
 2002 28: 1441Pers Soc Psychol Bull
Friedrich Försterling and Martin J. Binser
Depression, School Performance, and the Veridicality of Perceived Grades and Causal Attributions
 
 
Published by:
 http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
 
 
 Society for Personality and Social Psychology
 can be found at:Personality and Social Psychology BulletinAdditional services and information for 
 
 
 
 
 http://psp.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: 
 
 http://psp.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 
 http://psp.sagepub.com/content/28/10/1441.refs.htmlCitations: 
 
 What is This?
 
- Oct 1, 2002Version of Record >> 
 at LMU Muenchen on May 16, 2013psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
10.1177/014616702236875
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Försterling, Binser / ATTRIBUTIONAL VERIDICALITY
Depression, School Performance, and the Veridicality
of Perceived Grades and Causal Attributions
Friedrich Försterling
Martin J. Binser
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich
An external criterion was assessed to test whether depressives
have distorted perceptions of covariation information and
whether their attributions are consistent with this information.
Students’ actual and self-perceived grades, depression status,
and attributions for failures were assessed. Furthermore, partici-
pants estimated average grades. Generally, self-perceived own
past grades were inflated. Depressed students and those with low
grades distorted their own grades (but not the average grade)
more to their favor than individuals low in depression and those
with high grades. Depression went along with lower actual
grades and with internal, stable, and global failure attributions.
Mood differences in attributions were not due to differences in
previous grades. Depressed individuals drew (unrealistically)
more depressogenic causal inferences when they perceived aver-
age grades to be low than when average grades were perceived to
be high. However, they (realistically) attributed failure more in a
depressogenic fashion than did nondepressives when their own
grade history was low.
The issue of whether realistic assessments of one’s per-
sonal attributes and situational circumstances are associ-
ated with mental health or with mental dysfunctions is
being discussed in diverse literatures, such as in social,
clinical, personality, and cognitive psychology. In addi-
tion, much research has investigated whether realistic,
favorably distorted, or unrealistically pessimistic judg-
ments are beneficial or harmful (see, e.g., Colvin &
Block, 1994; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Taylor & Brown,
1988). The judgments that were investigated included
detection of contingencies (Alloy & Abramson, 1979),
perceptions of conveyed impressions (Campbell & Fehr,
1990), and estimations of frequencies of reinforcement
(Nelson & Craighead, 1977).
Among the many research studies investigating conse-
quences and correlates of realistic judgments, there is a
series of studies dedicated to the question of whether a
specific widespread disorder, that is, depression, is asso-
ciated with a specific type of judgment, that is, more or
less veridical causal attributions (see Alloy & Abramson,
1979; Försterling, 1994; Försterling, Bühner, & Gall,
1998; Haaga & Beck, 1995).
With regard to the causal judgments of depressives, it
has been suggested that their tendency to attribute fail-
ure to internal, stable, and global causes is more realistic
than the (comparatively more external, variable, and
specific) causal ascriptions of nondepressed persons:
Depressed individuals’ attributions are more “balanced”
than the ones of nondepressives. For instance, it was
found that depressives attributed success as well as fail-
ure about equally strongly to their ability, whereas
nondepressed individuals exhibited “self-serving”
attributional tendencies, that is, they attributed success
more so than failure to their ability (see Campbell &
Fairey, 1985; Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; see Taylor &
Brown, 1988, for a summary).
Several authors have doubted that the finding of
depressives making more “balanced” attributions (i.e.,
consistency between success and failure attributions)
reflects attributional veridicality (see Ackermann &
DeRubeis, 1991; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Colvin &
Block, 1994; Försterling, 1986, 1994). For instance,
attributing success more strongly to ability than failure
might be quite realistic. Individuals might typically select
tasks only when assuming to be able to solve them.
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Hence, failure to complete a task is inconsistent with
prior experiences and beliefs and attribution to external
causes such as chance might therefore be realistic. All of
these authors have criticized that there is no external cri-
terion against which attributions, for example, for suc-
cess versus failure, can be compared to decide which
attribution is correct.
Försterling (1986, 1994) has argued that the (spe-
cific) question of whether depressives’ attributions are
more realistic than nondepressives’ and the (more gen-
eral) question of whether realistic or distorted attribu-
tions favorably influence emotional well-being or
achievement behavior can be theoretically conceptual-
ized and empirically investigated while referring to theo-
ries about attribution antecedents.
More specifically, Försterling et al. (1998) have sug-
gested that the veridicality of an attribution can be deter-
mined on the basis of the fit of the attribution with the
antecedent covariation information (see Försterling,
1989; Kelley, 1967). For instance, an attribution of fail-
ure to an internal, stable, and global factor (e.g., lack of
ability) can be considered as realistic when the individ-
ual’s failure occurred with low consensus (most others
succeeded), high consistency (the individual failed this
task in the past as well), and low distinctiveness (he failed
at most other tasks). By contrast, if the attribution made
(e.g., to lack of ability) is not consistent with previous
covariation information, it can be considered as unreal-
istic (e.g., when a person fails at a task at which most oth-
ers fail [high consensus] and usually succeeds at this
[low consistency] and other tasks [high distinctive-
ness]). Note that according to the conceptualization of
attributional veridicality as “fit” of an attribution with
antecedent covariation information, unbalanced attri-
butions for success and failure can be quite realistic (for
instance, when success occurs with low consensus, low
distinctiveness, and high consistency, whereas there is
high consensus, high distinctiveness, and low consis-
tency of failure).
Försterling et al. (1998; Försterling & Bühner, in
press) have used this conception of veridicality to investi-
gate whether depressives in fact make more realistic
attributions than nondepressives. In one series of stud-
ies, covariation information was experimentally manipu-
lated in hypothetical scenarios (Försterling et al., 1998;
Studies 1 to 3) and a second series of studies (Försterling
et al., 1998, Study 4; Försterling & Bühner, in press,
Studies 1 and 2) assessed both causal attributions and
perceived covariation information.
In the studies that experimentally manipulated
covariation information, participants were classified as
depressed or nondepressed on the basis of the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson,
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). In addition, they were con-
fronted with the hypothetical scenarios typically used to
assess attributional style (“imagine that you fail an
important exam”; see Peterson et al., 1982). Further-
more, covariation information was provided in these
hypothetical scenarios; for instance, one group received
covariat ion information designed to lead to
depressogenic (internal, stable, and global) and the
other group received information designed to lead to
anti-depressogenic (external, variable, and specific) fail-
ure attributions. To induce depressogenic attributions,
for example, participants were asked to imagine that
most other individuals who took the exam succeeded at
it (low consensus) and that they also failed similar (high
consistency) and dissimilar (low distinctiveness) exams
in the past. To suggest antidepressogenic attributions, it
was indicated that most other individuals also failed the
exam (high consensus) and that they had succeeded at
similar (low consistency) and dissimilar tasks (high dis-
tinctiveness) in the past. As a dependent variable, it was
assessed to what extent depressive and nondepressive
persons attributed the described events to internal, sta-
ble, and global causes.
Försterling et al. (1998; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) did
not find significant differences with regard to the influ-
ence of covariation information on depressives’ or
nondepressives’ attributions. Depressives generally
showed a tendency to attribute failure more strongly to
internal, stable, and global causes than did non-
depressives, and covariation information too signifi-
cantly influenced attributions in the expected direction
(depressogenic covariation information leads to inter-
nal, stable, and global failure attributions, whereas
antidepressogenic information leads to external, vari-
able, and specific attributions). An interaction between
“depression” and “covariation information,” which
would indicate that the two mood groups differentially
process the presented covariation information, however,
was not found. Hence, these findings indicate that
depressives have a general bias to drawing more internal,
stable, and global attributions from experimentally pro-
vided covariation information; however, they do not pro-
cess covariation information in a different way than
nondepressives. One possibility for the lack of differen-
tial influence of covariation information on causal con-
clusions might be that hypothetical, experimentally pro-
vided covariation information does not possess the
necessary personal relevance for triggering depress-
ogenic information processing schemata.
In the studies that assessed (rather than experimen-
tally manipulated) perceived covariation information,
participants also were confronted with the above-
described scenarios. However, they indicated both their
causal attributions (e.g., how internal or external a cause
for a hypothetical failure might be) as well as perceived
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covariation information (e.g., perceived consensus, that
is, how many other individuals probably would have
failed at the task in question). The study revealed that
depressives made—also in relation to their self-per-
ceived covariation information—more internal, stable,
and global attributions for failure, hence, conceptually
replicating the reported findings regarding the causal
attributions drawn from experimentally provided
covariation information. However, depressives also
tended to assume that there was low consensus, high
consistency, and low distinctiveness of failure. In other
words, not only the attribution but also the perceived
information the attribution is presumably based on was
biased in a depressogenic direction.
As already indicated, the comparison of the attribu-
tions with self-perceived or experimentally provided
covariation information allows for a judgment about the
fit, consistency, or veridicality of the attribution (in rela-
tion to covariation information). However, the reported
differences between the mood groups regarding self-
perceived covariation information do not allow conclu-
sions about the veridicality of these perceptions, because
an external criterion for these perceptions is lacking. For
instance, the fact that depressives—compared to
nondepressives—assume low consensus with regard to
their failures (i.e., “I failed but others succeeded at this
task”) might reflect a correct assessment of the facts or a
biased perception. Or, more technically, none of the
studies investigating depressive attributions or perceived
covariation information has done both, that is, assessed
(or manipulated) actual covariation information before
measuring perceived covariation information (in addi-
tion to attributions). This, however, is necessary to assess
whether self-perceived covariation information is
veridical.
To summarize, studies manipulating covariation
information experimentally and studies assessing per-
ceived covariation information are silent as to whether
perceived covariation information is biased or correct.
The first type of study simply does not assess this parame-
ter and the second type of study does not assess an exter-
nal criterion (i.e., actual covariation information) to
compare with perceived covariation. Finally, both series
of studies have used hypothetical scenarios rather than
real life situations and hence might have used situations
that lack sufficient personal importance for triggering
depressogenic schemata.
To answer the question of whether perceived
covariation and/or attributions are biased or distorted,
studies are needed that assess both actual and perceived
covariation information as well as attributions. In addi-
tion, covariation information and attributions in highly
relevant personal contexts might be especially informa-
tive regarding the question of what cognitive processes
accompany depression.
An area of life in which such objective covariation
information is readily and reliably available and of great
personal importance is the school context. In addition,
the school context allows us to assess interesting long
range performance measures and constitutes an envi-
ronment with sufficient personal relevance to elicit
affective reactions such as depression. Attributions for
failure at a certain task (e.g., a math exam) as well as per-
ceived covariation information can be related to actual
previous covariation information (i.e., outcomes), more
specifically to consistency information (i.e., perfor-
mances in math in the past), distinctiveness (e.g., perfor-
mances in German or English), and consensus informa-
tion (i.e., the outcomes of all other classmates and/or
the outcomes of the classmates that might be especially
important for the respective students and therefore lend
themselves for social comparison). Hence, personally
highly important “objective” covariation information is
available for a comparison with perceived covariation
information and attributions. Therefore, the present
research assessed subjectively perceived and actual
school grades to determine whether depressed or non-
depressed individuals are more realistic.
METHOD
Participants
The study included 85 female and 98 male students of
Grades 9 and 10 of a high school (Gymnasium) in
Munich. They participated in the study during their reg-
ular class hours.
Experimental Material
The data were assessed with the help of a question-
naire consisting of five pages. On the first page, partici-
pants identified their age and sex and were asked to
design their personal code that was needed to ensure
anonymity in the further steps of the study (they wrote
down the last letter of the first name of their mother, the
first letter of the first name of their father, the second let-
ter of their own first name, and the first letter of their
month of birth). Furthermore, they were asked to write
down their name and their code on a separate sheet of
paper that was handed to their teachers. This sheet of
paper was used (later) so that the teacher could retrieve
the grades from the archive. The teacher then gave these
grades together with the secret code but without the
name of the student to the experimenters.
On the second and third page of the booklet, causal
attributions for three hypothetical bad school grades
were assessed. The design of the items was guided by
the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) (Peterson
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et al., 1982). Participants were informed that we wanted
to assess how students explain their own failures and to
vividly imagine each of three depicted situations. In the
first item of the attribution questionnaire, they were
asked to imagine receiving “a very bad grade” in a math
exam and to write down what they perceived to be the
most important cause for this failure. In addition, they
indicated on scales ranging from 1 (resides entirely outside
of my person) to 10 (resides entirely within myself) whether
the reported cause for the failure was perceived to be
external or internal to their own person. The second
scale was designed to assess causal stability (1 = the cause
will never have relevance in the future to 10 = will always be rele-
vant in the future). A third scale assessed perceived
globality of the cause (1 = influences only this area to 10 =
influences also other areas). The second item consisted of
the same form with the only exception that the situation
to be imagined was a failure in English and the third item
concerned a hypothetical failure at an exam in German.
The second part of the questionnaire assessed stu-
dents’ self-perceived grades in math, English, and Ger-
man (i.e., perceived distinctiveness and consistency;
“What were your grades in math, English, and German
on your last report card?”). In addition, we assessed their
perception of the average grades of their classmates in
these areas (i.e., perceived consensus; “Please estimate
the average grade in your class in the following areas:
math, English, and German”). Finally, participants indi-
cated the grades in math, English, and German of the
three classmates they liked most.
The third part of the questionnaire consisted of a
short (six item) version of the BDI. The following items
were taken from the original BDI (“I am not sad . . . I am
so sad and unhappy that I can hardly stand it anymore”;
“I can enjoy things as much as in the past . . . I am discon-
tent and bored with everything”; “I am not disappointed
with myself . . . I hate myself”; “I do not feel like a fail-
ure . . . I have the feeling to be a total failure”; “I am as
decisive as ever . . . I cannot make decisions anymore”; “I
can work as good as before . . . I am unable to work”).
RESULTS
Grades and Perceived Grades
Students’ perceived cumulative grades (numeric val-
ues reaching from 1 = “A” to 5 = “F”) strongly correlated
with their actual grades as retrieved from the archival
records, r(182) = .95, p < .001. However, a 2 (actual vs.
self-perceived grades) × 3 (area: math, English, and Ger-
man) ANOVA with repeated measures revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for the first factor, indicating that indi-
viduals judged their grades to be better (M = 3.18) than
they actually were (M = 3.23), F(1, 181) = 11.13, p < .001.
When separately looking at the three different areas,
most students reported their grades accurately (84.1%
in math; 82.0% in English; and 85.7% in German). Very
few students reported that their grade was worse than it
actually was (1.6% in math, 5.5% in English, and 4.2% in
German; i.e., in 22 of the 183 participants × 3 areas = 549
instances [3.7%]) and none of these individuals dis-
torted more than one grade to their own disfavor. By
comparison, more individuals showed inflated self-per-
ceptions of grades (10.6% in math, 8.5% in English, and
5.8% in German; i.e., in 47 of the 549 instances = 8.6%),
and among cases of inflated memories of their grades,
there were 4 missing their true grades by more than one
grade.
With regard to the estimations of the average class
notes in math, English, and German, a 2 (objective vs.
subjective average class grade) × 3 (areas: math, English,
German) ANOVA with repeated measures did not reveal
a significant main effect for subjective versus objective
average grade (F < 1), reflecting that subjective estima-
tions of the overall average grade did not differ from the
actual overall grade. However, there was a significant
main effect for area, F(2, 360) = 65.27, p < .001, reflecting
that both objective and subjective grades were best for
English (M = 3.01), second best for German (M = 3.25),
and worst for math (M = 3.38). In addition, there was a
significant interaction for the factors Subjective Versus
Objective Mean Grade and Area, F(2, 360) = 3.05, p < .05,
reflecting that pupils estimated the average grades in
math and English to be worse than they actually were,
whereas the average grade in German was rated to be
better than it was. (Neither of these main effects or inter-
actions regarding the actual and perceived average class
notes were qualified by interactions with BDI or ASQ
scores or with overall grade.)
To summarize, with regard to the question of whether
perceived covariation information (self-perceived own
grades [i.e., consistency and distinctiveness] and per-
ceived average class grades [i.e., consensus]) are
veridical or biased, we found that most individuals in
most cases had accurate memories of their own grades
on their report card. The individuals who did not accu-
rately report their grades predominantly erred in a self-
serving fashion, that is, they reported better grades than
they actually had. With regard to perceived average
school grades (i.e., perceived consensus), we could not
detect such a bias. Perceived average grades in class accu-
rately reflected the true mean grade. Hence, in the con-
text of school grades, there is a tendency to bias per-
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ceived consistency and distinctiveness favorably and to
realistically perceive consensus information.
Attributions, Depression, and Grades
High depression scores went along with depress-
ogenic attributions (aggregated across the three dimen-
sions and the three areas [math, English, and German]),
r(183) = .17, p < .024. In addition, high depression scores
went along with low actual overall grades, r = .14, p < .06,
and (nonsignificantly) with low perceived grades, r(183) =
.11, p < .13.
Individuals with low grades made more depresso-
genic attributions than did individuals with high grades.
This was true in general, r(182) = .15, p < .04, as well as for
the individual areas of math, r(181) = .18, p < .014, Eng-
lish, r(180) = .13, p < .09, and German r(182) = .17, p <
.024. Attributions for one area (e.g., German) also corre-
lated positively with the performance at another area
(e.g., math; r = .09, ns); however, correlations between
attribution and performance measures were always
highest when both concerned the same area.
Naturally, there was also a significant relation
between perceived overall grade and overall attribution,
r(183) = .16, p < .03, as well as between perceived grades
in the individual areas and the attributions made for fail-
ure at the respective areas, math, r(182) = 19, p < .01,
English, r(181) = .12, ns, and German, r(183) = .21, p <
.01.
The actual or perceived average grade in the respec-
tive areas, however, did not significantly correlate with
attributions (r = .09 and r = –.08, respectively). Neither
was there a significant correlation between the average
grade for the three best friends and attributions or
depression.
In sum, we found the expected relations between
covariation information (i.e., actual and perceived
grades) and causal attributions for consistency as well as
distinctiveness, but not for (actual or perceived) consen-
sus. In addition, the classical finding of a tendency to
make internal, stable, and global failure attributions to
go along with depression was replicated. Moreover, we
too found that depression was related with actual
covariation information (i.e., actual grades). These find-
ings are consistent with the idea that low grades (i.e.,
“depressogenic” actual covariation information) lead to
depressogenic self-perceived covariation information
that, in turn, triggers depressogenic attributions that
subsequently lead to depression. Or, in other words, this
pattern of findings is consistent with the idea that
depressives are in a worse situation than nondepressives
and differences in the attributions of the mood groups
are reflections of this (perceived) situation.
Veridicality-Related Analyses
As outlined above, with regard to the veridicality of
perceived covariation information, we found a general
tendency to favorably distort self-perceived grades. A
one-way ANOVA with three categories of depression
(low, intermediate, and high values) for degree of distor-
tion (objective minus subjective grades in the three
areas) as a dependent variable revealed a significant dif-
ference between the mood groups, F(2, 182) = 3.05, p <
.05, indicating that individuals high in depression had
more positively distorted perceptions of their own
grades (M = .11) than did individuals with intermediate
(M = .008) or low degrees of depression (M = .04). The
tendency to distort was not connected with attributional
style, r(182) = –.02.
In addition, an ANOVA with three levels of overall
objective grade (low, intermediate, and high) as a quasi-
independent variable and degree of distortion as a
dependent variable revealed a significant main effect,
F(2, 182) = 6.71, p < .002, indicating that individuals with
low grades distorted their self-perceived grades more in
a positive direction (M = 0.12) than did individuals with
intermediate (M = 0.04) and high grades (M = –.019).
Hence, a positive distortion of one’s own grades went
hand in hand with low performance.
As already indicated above, there was neither a gen-
eral tendency to distort the average class grade nor an
influence on the tendency to distort the average class
grade as a function of attributional style, depression, or
general overall grade level.
To assess the veridicality of the attributions of
depressed and nondepressed individuals, partial corre-
lations were calculated: If the above-reported correla-
tion between depression and attributional style, r(183) =
.17, p < .03, would indicate that depressed—as compared
to nondepressed—individuals’ attributions only realisti-
cally reflected differences in their objective or self-per-
ceived grades, we would expect this correlation to
become insignificant when actual and/or perceived
grades were partialed out. However, this was not the case.
After partialing out objective overall grades and self-per-
ceived grades, respectively, the correlation between
depression and attributional style still remained signifi-
cant, r(181) = .15, p < .05, and r(181) = .15, p < .05,
respectively.
We also calculated partial correlations for the relation
between actual overall grades and attributional style and
between self-perceived overall grades and attributional
style while controlling for depression. These correla-
tions too remained stable when BDI scores were
partialed out, r(179) = .13, p < .07 (ASQ and subjective
grades) and r(180) = .14, p < .05 (ASQ and objective
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grades). Hence, these results indicate that the correla-
tion between attributional style and depression is not
mediated by self-perceived or actual grades and that,
therefore, the mood differences with regard to the ten-
dency to make internal, stable, and global attributions
does not reflect antecedent covariation information and
should therefore reflect lack of realism of (one of the
two) mood groups. In addition, the reported configura-
tion of results also suggests that the influence of grades
on attributional style is not mediated by depression.
Another methodological possibility to test more spe-
cifically whether (and how) the attributions of depressed
and nondepressed individuals are differentially influ-
enced by covariation information (i.e., actual or per-
ceived grades) consists of ANOVAs. For instance, we
would expect that failure is attributed more to internal,
stable, and global factors when previous grades were low
than when they were high (i.e., when failure occurred
with high consistency and low distinctiveness). Further-
more, if individuals differing in depression would draw
different attributional conclusions from their previous
performances, we would expect an interaction between
mood status and previous overall grade.
A 2 (levels of depression: high vs. low) × 3 (average
own grade level: high vs. intermediate vs. low) ANOVA
with overall attributional style scores as a dependent vari-
able only revealed the already reported significant main
effect for depression, F(1, 181) = 5.21, p < .03, and no sig-
nificant main effect for overall grades (F < 1) and, most
important, no significant interaction between overall
grades and depression (F = 1.22). With regard to the
quasi-independent variable perceived overall grades,
the respective ANOVA (3 levels of perceived grades × 2
levels of depression), however, revealed a marginally sig-
nificant interaction, F(2, 183) = 2.42, p < .09, reflecting
the fact that depressives made (realistically) more inter-
nal, stable, and global attributions when their previous
self-perceived grades were low than when they were
high, whereas nondepressives’ attributions were com-
paratively uninfluenced by their self-perceived grades
(see Figure 1). When entering high and low self-per-
ceived grades only into the ANOVA (i.e., while leaving
out intermediate self-perceived grades), the interaction
(with depression) became significant on the conven-
tional level, F(1, 118) = 4.10, p < .05.
Hence, the results of these ANOVA reflect that
depressed and nondepressed pupils’ attributions are
equally (in-)sensitive to objective (consistency and dis-
tinctiveness) covariation information (i.e., objective
grades), whereas depressives seem to be somewhat more
strongly influenced by self-perceived covariation infor-
mation. Most important, depressives (more so than
nondepressives) showed attributional conclusions con-
sistent with the covariation principle in that they traced
back failure occurring against the background of low
previous performance more to internal, stable, and
global factors than failure occurring against the back-
ground of high self-perceived grades.
Next, we investigated what attributional conclusions
are drawn from actual and self-perceived consensus
information (i.e., the average grade in class). Recall that
the mean estimate of the average grade did not correlate
with depression and performance level. However, it
might well be that individuals differing in overall perfor-
mance and/or depression draw different attributional
conclusions from this (unbiased) representation of the
average grade. Hence, we calculated a 2 (levels of depres-
sion: high vs. low) × 3 (perceived average grade level:
high vs. intermediate vs. low) ANOVA with overall
attributional style scores as a dependent variable. In
addition to the unsurprising (and already reported)
main effect for depression level, this ANOVA too
revealed an interesting interaction between perceived
average grades and depression, which approached sig-
nificance, F(2, 182) = 2.58, p < .07 (see Figure 2). This
interaction reflected the fact that when perceived aver-
age grades were high, depressed and nondepressed indi-
viduals’ attributions did not differ in their failure attribu-
tions. If the perceived average grade, however, was
intermediate or low, depressed pupils made more
depressogenic attributions than did nondepressed
pupils (again, this interaction reached the traditional
significance level when only high and low grades were
entered into the ANOVA), F(1, 111) = 4.53, p < .04. When
objective average grade was entered into the analysis, no
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significant main effect or interactions in addition to the
already reported main effect occurred. Hence, with
regard to social norms (consensus information, i.e., the
actual and perceived average grade), depressed persons’
attributions seem to be more unrealistic in relation to
covariation information (i.e., consensus) than
nondepressed individuals’ causal judgments in that they
tend to attribute a failure in a situation in which grades
are generally low more to internal, stable, and global
causes than failure in an area with generally high grades.
Finally, with regard to the influence of the perceived
average grades of the three most liked peers on attribu-
tions, a 2 (high vs. low depression) × 3 (high vs. interme-
diate vs. low grades) ANOVA did not reveal a significant
main effect for “best liked peer grade” or an interaction
of this factor with depression.
To summarize, there are mood differences with
regard to the translation of actual covariation informa-
tion to self-perceived covariation in that depressed indi-
viduals—more so than nondepressives—positively dis-
tort their perceptions of consistency and distinctiveness
(i.e., their own past grades). Such distortions are also
characteristic for individuals with low (rather than high)
actual grades. In addition, the two mood groups differ in
the way they draw attributional inferences from per-
ceived covariation information. Contrary to non-
depressed students, depressives with a previous history
of low grades make more internal, stable, and global
(and hence realistic) attributions than those with a his-
tory of high grades. However, when attributions are set
into a relation with the perceived grades of the peers in
class, depressed persons seem to be more unrealistic
than nondepressives: They make (unlike non-
depressives) more internal, stable, and global attribu-
tions for failures when the grades of others are perceived
to be low than when they are high.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, the complete attributional
sequence (i.e., objective covariation information [previ-
ous school grades], perceived covariation [memorized
school grades], attributions, and emotional reactions)
was assessed to investigate whether depressives are more
or less realistic than nondepressives. The school context
appears to be an ideal site for such investigations
because (a) objective covariation information (i.e.,
school grades) is reliably available on records and hence
lends itself as an objective criterion against which self-
perceptions can be compared (see also Robins & Beer,
2001); (b) students definitely have fairly good—however
not perfect—memories of their prior grades; (c) grades
are of a great personal relevance; and (d) school perfor-
mances are clearly stimuli for causal explanations. Many
of the reported results support these assumptions. For
instance, the study revealed that students had a fairly
good recollection of their grades and attributions for
school performances and overall grades themselves are
related to depression.
Moreover, the present study replicated several classi-
cal findings regarding the relation between attributions,
depression, and achievement behavior, strengthening
the trust that the empirical tools used also can be mean-
ingfully applied to the more specific issues that are
addressed by the present research, that is, the
attributional veridicality of the mood groups. Consistent
with previous literature, we found that both pupils with
low grades and those who are depressed attributed fail-
ure more to internal, stable, and global causes than did
high achievers and nondepressed persons. The finding
that individuals with a history of poor performances
attribute failure in a more depressogenic fashion is con-
sistent with the covariation principle in that low overall
grades imply that failure occurred consistently and
nondistinctively with low consensus (see, for a summary,
Försterling, 1989). The finding that depressed individu-
als make internal stable and global attributions is consis-
tent with data of numerous previous studies (see, for a
summary, Buchanan & Seligman, 1994).
More important, the present study was designed to
assess the veridicality of perceived covariation informa-
tion and the attributions of depressed versus non-
depressed individuals by comparing these judgments
with parameters of the situation, that is, own previous
performances in this area (consistency), performances
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in other areas (distinctiveness), and previous perfor-
mances of others (consensus).
With regard to the objective situation, we found that
depressed individuals had a disadvantage when com-
pared to their nondepressed peers, that is, depressives
had lower overall grades than nondepressives. In addi-
tion, as a consequence, their achievements were—in
relation to their peers—worse than the achievements of
nondepressed individuals. In other words, failures at
school occur for the depressed person with (relatively)
high consistency, low distinctiveness, and low consensus.
When considering the subjectively perceived
covariation information (i.e., perceived own grades and
perceived average grades of their classmates), we found
that depressed individuals—when compared to non-
depressed persons—tended to have positively distorted
representations regarding their own previous achieve-
ments (i.e., grades in the same and other areas, i.e., con-
sistency and distinctiveness) but not with regard to the
average grade (consensus). Similarly, we found that indi-
viduals with low overall performance had a less accurate
self-perception (i.e., positive illusions) of their previous
grades when compared to individuals high in achieve-
ment. To our knowledge, the present study is one of the
few investigations that allows for a clear comparison of
self-perceptions with an external criterion (see Colvin &
Block, 1994), and it clearly shows that although positive
illusions might be a characteristic of the general sample
(in that respect they replicate the general message of
Taylor & Brown, 1988, and with regard to the self-per-
ceived school grades, data of Bahrick, Hall, & Berger,
1996), they are most pronounced among those who are
depressed and low achievers. The causal relation among
grades, depression, and distortion remains to be investi-
gated. Because depression and grades are correlated, it
is possible that low grades lead to distorted memories of
one’s own grades only inasmuch as low grades lead to
depression. On the other hand, depression might only
lead to distortion inasmuch as it is connected with low
grades.
It is worth emphasizing that the inclusion of an objec-
tive external criterion revealed interesting insights con-
cerning the genotypic determinants of the mood differ-
ences regarding self-perceived school grades (i.e.,
perceived covariation information). At first glance, and
in the absence of an external criterion, the (non-
significant) positive correlation between self-perceived
(low) grades (i.e., perceived consistency and distinctive-
ness) and depression might be interpreted as a realistic
assessment or even a tendency for a pessimistic bias of
depressives to viewing reality as worse than it is. The
assessment of objective grades, however, revealed that
depressives’ self-perceived grades are higher than the
ones of nondepressives when compared to the actual
grades. Hence, perceptions that look at first glance as
pessimistic biases (i.e., when comparing perceived
covariation between mood groups) might genotypically
turn out to be positive biases (i.e., when comparing with
an external criterion).
Due to the correlational nature of the study, it is natu-
rally not possible to decide whether the reported positive
illusions are causes or consequences of depression. How-
ever, the finding that depressives have—possibly as a
denial mechanism designed to avoid embarrassment—
positive illusions in certain situations is certainly interest-
ing and it might have been overlooked in previous
research that has not incorporated objective parameters
of the situation.
The assessments of the objective and subjectively per-
ceived covariation information also made it possible to
investigate whether depressives and nondepressives
draw different attributional conclusions from the
parameters that characterize their situation. Most
important, we found that depressives drew more inter-
nal, stable, and global attributional conclusions from the
parameters characterizing their situation than did
nondepressives. Correlational analyses revealed that the
relation between depression and attributional style did
not disappear when covariation information (i.e., past
actual and/or perceived grades) was statistically con-
trolled for. This finding shows that the difference between
the attributions of depressed and nondepressed persons
cannot be entirely traced back to differences in
attributionally relevant antecedent information.
However, this finding is not informative with regard to
the question as to whether depressives or nondepressives
have biased or veridical attributions in relation to their
actual or self-perceived grades (covariation informa-
tion). More informative concerning this question is the
finding of a statistical interaction between depression
and perceived average grade for the dependent variable
of attributional style. We found that depressives (more so
than nondepressives) drew attributional conclusions
consistent with the covariation principle in that they
traced back failure occurring against the background of
low previous performance more to internal, stable, and
global factors than failure occurring against the back-
ground of high self-perceived grades. In that respect,
they were more realistic in their attributions than were
nondepressives.
However, in a perceived situation of high consensual
failure (i.e., when pupils perceived the average grade to
be low), depressed persons—but not nondepressed per-
sons—made more internal, stable, and global attribu-
tions for failure than when failure occurred with low con-
sensus (i.e., perceived average grades were high). The
covariation principle would clearly suggest that attribu-
tions of consensual failure should be less depressogenic
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than attributions of failure occurring with low consen-
sus. Hence, the attributional conclusions of depressives
from the above-mentioned (low-consensus) informa-
tion can be labeled unrealistic.
Somewhat more abstractly, the presented data might
best be summarized as follows: Depressive pupils have
lower grades than nondepressives (i.e., they are in a
worse objective situation) and they somewhat positively
distort their own grades (i.e., consistency and distinctive-
ness) but have (similar to nondepressives) an accurate
perception of the grade of their peers (i.e., consensus).
Based on their (somewhat positively biased) perceptions
of their own grades and on the (accurate) perception of
the grades of their peers, they draw more depressogenic
attributional conclusions than nondepressives. How-
ever, these attributional conclusions are not uniformly
more unrealistic. More specifically, depressives make
(unrealistically) more depressogenic attributions for
failure than do nondepressives when consensus is high.
However, they (realistically) make more depressogenic
attributions than nondepressives when consistency of
own failure is high and distinctiveness is low.
Naturally, the present operationalization of attri-
butional veridicality (i.e., the fit between attributions
and perceived covariation information) has limitations.
For instance, it does not take into account the temporal
sequence of effects and their potential causes. Hence, a
covarying entity (e.g., the ringing of the alarm clock)
might mistakenly be classified as a realistic causal per-
ception of an effect (the sunrise). However, temporal
contiguity could easily be integrated in our definition
and operationalization of veridicality and, more impor-
tant, it is not relevant for the present context of attribu-
tions for school grades.
Moreover, the study has limitations. It investigated
only attributions for a “very bad” grade and not for a
hypothetical “very good” one. It also did not investigate
attributions for actual grades but only for hypothetical
ones. It remains to be tested whether the attributions of
the mood groups differentially reflect antecedent
covariation information when such different stimuli are
being used.
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